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WALKING THE LINE OF LIQUOR LIABILITY:
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
V. TODD
I. INTRODUCTION
Because nearly one-half of all automobile fatalities involve intoxi-
cated drivers and the costs of alcohol-related accidents have been esti-
mated at more than twenty four billion dollars per year, legislatures and
courts have continually expanded the liability of servers of alcoholic bev-
erages. 1 In 1986, Oklahoma joined the majority of states by abrogating
the common law rule of tavern owner nonliability in Brigance v. Velvet
Dove Restaurant, Inc.2 In Brigance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court al-
lowed a third party to recover from a tavern owner after the tavern
owner negligently served alcohol to a patron who subsequently injured
the third party.3
Recently, in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Todd (Todd 1),4 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court extended liability even further. Concluding
that the tavern owner could be found to be negligent in serving an intoxi-
cated patron, the court allowed even the patron a cause of action to re-
cover for injuries he inflicted upon himself while drunk. However, on
rehearing only seven months later, the court vacated its earlier decision
(Todd I1).5
Although Todd II further defined the parameters of Oklahoma li-
quor liability, issues regarding social host and commercial vendor liabil-
ity in relation to minors and mentally disabled persons remain unsettled
and would be more appropriately and efficiently served with specific leg-
islation than with judicially made law. This comment will present an
overview of the history of liquor liability, explore Oklahoma's current
position on liquor liability, and present a model dram shop act as an
alternative to the need for further judicial interpretation.
1. Lauren A. Kostas, Note, Negligent Failure to Refuse Service to an Already Intoxicated Pa-
tron Renders Alcoholic Beverage Licensee Liable for the Intentional Torts of Intoxicated Patrons, 20
Tax. TECH L. REv. 1323, 1325 (1989).
2. 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
3. See id.
4. 61 OKLA. B.J. 3016 (1990).
5. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508 (Okla. 1991).
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II. COMMERCIAL VENDOR LIABILITY
At common law, a negligence cause of action could not be success-
fully litigated against a purveyor of alcohol for injuries suffered by the
inebriate or a third party.6 Using negligence principles, courts reasoned
that the drinking rather than the serving of alcohol was the proximate
cause of any damages.7 Because of the rising costs to the public, many
states imposed liability on the commercial vendor through legislation.,
Enactment of dram shop acts abrogated common law nonliability by spe-
cifically providing a cause of action against the furnisher of alcohol to
those injured by the intoxicated person.9
While twenty-three states have imposed varying degrees of civil lia-
bility through dram shop statutes,' ° other states instead have imposed
liability through judicially made law." For example, in Rappaport v.
Nichols,12 a minor who had been served liquor at a tavern was involved
in an accident injuring a third person. Although New Jersey did not
have a dram shop statute providing a specific cause of action, the court
allowed an action to commence under negligence principles on the
grounds that the server had violated the state's alcohol beverage control
statute. 3 The court's determination was a significant departure from
earlier decisions that failed to find either causation or a duty on the part
6. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
7. Id. § 554. The sale of liquor to an intoxicated person is not the legal and natural cause of
the death of a third party so as to render the seller liable in damages. See Belding v. Johnson, 12 S.E.
304 (Ga. 1890).
8. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, 1135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28-A, §§ 2501-2519 (West 1988).
9. A person is normally considered intoxicated if, because of his consumption of alcohol there
is a weakening of his physical and mental capabilities, causing his inability to act and think with
ordinary care. Bass v. Rothschild Liquor Stores, Inc., 232 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Il1. App. Ct. 1967).
10. Scott Heard, Comment, The Liability of Purveyors ofAlcoholic Beverages for Torts of Intoxi-
cated Customers, 47 MoNT. L. REv. 495, 496 n.5 (1986). The following states have dram shop acts:
Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming. Id.
11. See, eg., Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Alesna v. Legrue, 614
P.2d 1387 (Alaska 1980); Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983); McClellan v. Tottenhoff,
666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983); Freeman v. Finney, 309 S.E.2d 531 (N.C. 1983).
12. 156 A.2d I (N.J. 1959).
13. Id. at 10.
We are fully mindful that policy considerations and the balancing of the conflicting inter-
ests are the truly vital factors in the molding and application of common law principles of
negligence and proximate causation. But we are convinced that recognition of the plain-
tiff's claim will afford a fairer measure of justice to innocent third parties whose injuries are
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of a tavern owner.14 In Rappaport, the court concluded that a jury could
reasonably find that the vendor's action of serving liquor caused a third
party's injuries."5 In looking at the legislature's intent in enacting an
alcohol beverage control statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors
and intoxicated persons, the court determined that the purpose was to
protect the general public, thus creating a duty on the part of the tavern
owner. 6 The court concluded that when a vendor serves liquor to a
member of this protected class, the duty is breached. 7
Many states have some form of alcoholic beverage control statutes
that prohibit the furnishing of alcohol to specific classes of persons such
as minors, intoxicated persons, and alcoholics.18 In some jurisdictions,
violation of a liquor control statute is negligence per se, 19 but in other
states, the violation of the statute is only evidence from which one may
infer negligence.20
Although most states will not find liability without the use of alco-
hol beverage control statutes or dram shop acts,2 ' a few courts have
found vendor liability based solely on common law negligence.22 In these
states, vendors face almost unlimited liability unless the court permits
the pleading of affirmative defenses.23 By comparison, some states with
dram shop statutes have dollar limitations that shield the vendor from
excessive liability.24 Some states also require a plaintiff to give notice of
his injury and of his intent to sue within a short period of time after the
accident to prevent the unfair surprise of an action filed just before the
expiration of the statute of limitations.25
14. See AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 6, § 553.
15. Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 9.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id. at 8-9.
18. See Heard, supra note 10, at 496 n.5.
19. See, e.g., Trail v. Christian, 213 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1973); Elder v. Fisher, 217 N.E.2d 847
(Ind. 1966).
20. See, e.g., Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980); Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's
Liquor Inc., 453 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1983); Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 335 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983); Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959); Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269 (N.M.
1982); McClelland v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
21. See Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1978); Konsler v. United States,
288 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
22. See Young v. Gilbert, 296 A.2d 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
23. RONALD S. BEITMAN, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO LIQUOR LIABILITY LITIGATION 9
(1987). However, some states which have enacted dram shop statutes have also allowed actions to
proceed under negligence theories when it has been proven that the dram shop statute doesn't apply
to the particular circumstances. See, eg., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978).
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III. SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
Social host civil liability can be founded on either liquor control
statutes or the duty of general care one person owes to another.26 Non-
commercial servers include individual hosts, fraternities, groups, and em-
ployer hosts.2 7 Fewer states have imputed civil liability to the social host
than to the commercial server,28 reasoning that the typical social host is
less experienced than the commercial vendor in dealing with liquor and
may be less capable of bearing the costs of liability.2 9
Generally, courts have not allowed social host liability based on
dram shop acts.3" In the two states (Iowa and Minnesota)3I allowing
recovery against a social host based on those states' dram shop acts, the
legislatures amended their dram shop acts to prevent such a broad inter-
pretation.32 Not wanting to risk judicial interpretation, some states have
expressly declined to create social host liability in their dram shop acts. 33
IV. THIRD PARTY AND FIRST PARTY RECOVERY
States have not uniformly determined whether an injured party has
a cause of action against a tavern owner. Among those states allowing a
cause of action, there exists even more variance regarding which parties
can recover. Recovering parties can be divided into two major groups:
third parties and first parties.
26. See Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Brattain v. Herron, 309
N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Thaut v. Finley, 213 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). These
courts allowed alcoholic beverage control statutes to be applied against noncommercial vendors,
27. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984) (individual social host); Wiener v.
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971) (fraternity); Dickin-
son v. Edwards, 716 P.2d 814 (Wash. 1986) (employer).
28. See BrrMA^, supra note 23, at 11-14.
29. See Timothy R. Duncan, Noncommercial Liquor Vendor Liability: Social Host and Em-
ployer Host Liability in Minnesota, 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 223, 236 (1986).
30. The following cases have held that dram shop acts do not apply to persons who gratuitously
provide alcoholic beverages: DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979); Heldt
v. Brei, 455 N.E.2d 842 (Il. App. Ct. 1983); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 199 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1964); Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985); Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d
593 (Minn. 1982); Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, 464 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 1984);
Manning v. Andy, 310 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1973).
31. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972), overruled by Lewis v. State, 256
N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977); Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1972). With regard to social hosts
who had provided liquor to a minor, both courts broadly interpreted the state's dram shop statute to
include the social host.
32. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West
1990).
33. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West 1985).
4
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A. Third Party Recovery
Third parties can be categorized into those suing for recovery based
on their own injuries and those suing to recover for injuries of another
person. A third party plaintiff is typically an innocent bystander who is
injured by an intoxicated person and subsequently brings suit against the
furnisher of alcohol. While most states allow third party recovery, juris-
dictions vary on whether the innocent bystander may recover for per-
sonal injuries34 and for property damage.35
Courts may limit or bar a third party's recovery if the plaintiff
joined, 36 procured,37 or encouraged 38 another's intoxication. Such ac-
tions may raise issues of contributory or comparative negligence.39 In
addition, some courts have barred or limited the passenger's recovery,
reasoning that he assumes the risk of injury when he knowingly rides in a
car with an inebriate.' However, courts are split on this issue as some
courts have held that the third party assumed the risk,4 while others
have reasoned that riding in the car was not an adequately affirmative
role to warrant the denial of recovery.42
The second category of third party plaintiff includes a party seeking
to recover damages for personal injuries or death of another person, for
loss of consortium, or for loss of support or service from an injured per-
son.43 Most courts will allow recovery for loss of support,' but recovery
34. George A. Locke, Annotation, Recovery Under Civil Damage (Dram Shop) Act for In-
tangibles such as Mental Anguish, Embarrassment, Loss of Affection or Companionship, or the Like,
78 A.L.R. 3D 1199, 1202-03 (1977).
35. Id.
36. See James v. Wicker, 33 N.E.2d 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941); Plamondon v. Matthews, 385
N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Barrett v. Campbell, 345 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
37. Id. See also Douglas v. Athens Market Corp., 49 N.E.2d 834 (InI. App. Ct. 1943).
38. See supra notes 36-37. But see Morris v. Farley Enterprises, Inc., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska
1983) (finding complicity would not bar a third party's recovery).
39. BErTMAN, supra note 23, at 125.
40. See Goss v. Richmond, 381 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). The court set out criteria
to be considered in determining whether the passenger had assumed the risk of riding with an intoxi-
cated driver:
1. The driver's intoxication
2. The injured person's knowledge of the driver's intoxication and the danger involved
3. The availability of an alternative course to the injured party
4. The injured party's voluntary choice to accept the risk, and
5. Showing that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury.
BErrMAN, supra note 23, at 125. But see Rhyner v. Madden, 457 A.2d 1243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law.
Div. 1982). If the plaintiff passengers were served alcoholic beverages while visibly intoxicated, the
plaintiff's conduct in riding with the drunk driver could not be a basis of a finding of the plaintiff's
negligence. Id. at 1246.
41. See Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985).
42. See Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1967).
43. See, eg., Swanson v. Ball, 290 N.W. 482 (S.D. 1940); Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't
1991]
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for intangibles such as mental anguish or loss of consortium varies even
in jurisdictions with dram shop acts.45 Whether a third party can re-
cover for intangibles depends mainly upon the wording of the dram shop
statute.4 6 Where the statute limits recovery to personal injuries or prop-
erty damage, courts will strictly construe the statute, disallowing recov-
ery for loss of intangibles.47
B. First Party Recovery
The first party case raises issues of public policy and contributory or
comparative negligence. 4 The first party plaintiff is the inebriate who
sues the furnisher of alcohol to recover for injuries he sustained as a re-
sult of his own intoxication.49 In jurisdictions having contributory negli-
gence standards, courts have found the plaintiff's intoxication to be a
complete bar to recovery, holding that the plaintiff's negligence inter-
vened and became the proximate cause of his injury." Public policy has
also provided the basis for rejection of a first party claim." For example,
in Allen v. Westchester,52 the court refused to allow recovery to a widow
for the pain and suffering of her deceased husband who became intoxi-
cated and sustained fatal injuries from a subsequent fall. 3 The court
reasoned that the intoxicated person should be held responsible for his
Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960) (holding a third party can
recover for loss of consortium, support, or services of another).
44. See Heard, supra note 10, at 497.
45. See, e.g., Swanson, 290 N.W. at 482. But see Rogers v. Dwight, 145 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.
Wis. 1956) (limiting recovery to loss of support only).
46. Locke, supra note 34, at 1205-08.
47. See, eg., Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (Il1. 1961); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Village of Isle, 122 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1963). There are exceptions to the general rule. In some
jurisdictions damages for mental anguish and the like have been held recoverable under dram shop
statutes limiting recovery to personal injury or property damage, where the anguish suffered by the
plaintiff was a concomitant cause or an effect of actual physical injury. See, eg., Duckworth v.
Stalnaker, 69 S.E. 850 (W. Va. 1910); Podbielski v. Argyle Bowl, Inc., 220 N.W.2d 397 (Mich.
1974). But there are exceptions to the general rule allowing recovery for mental anguish under
broad dram shop statues when the plaintiff failed to prove mental anguish suffered as a consequence
of the intoxication for which the defendant was responsible. See Robertson v. Devereaux, 188
N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sissing v. Beach, 58 N.W. 364 (Mich. 1894).
48. See BErrMAN, supra note 23, at 9.
49. Id. at 124.
50. See, eg., Swartzenberger v. Billings Labor Temple Ass'n, 586 P.2d 712 (Mont. 1978), over-
ruled by Bisset v. DMI, Inc., 717 P.2d 545 (Mont. 1986) (after Montana adopted a comparative
negligence scheme).
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own actions.5 4 However, other courts have reasoned that the state liquor
control statute or dram shop act was also enacted to protect intoxicated
persons from their own incompetence and helplessness, and therefore
furnished a method of recovery to the first person as well.55
Most states have adopted some form of comparative negligence
scheme which lessens the harshness of contributory negligence as a com-
plete bar to recovery 6 However, these jurisdictions must still determine
whether comparative negligence should be limited as a defense tool when
the plaintiff is a member of a particular statutorily protected class, such
as a minor or a mentally disabled person. To date, only a few courts
have addressed this question and the trend seems to favor the application
of comparative negligence. 7
Despite the trend favoring comparative negligence in limited cir-
cumstances, a majority of states have continued to apply the contributory
negligence standard to a first party plaintiff, barring his cause of action."
Courts have been unwilling to find a duty by the server of alcohol under
common negligence principles to the first party plaintiff who becomes
voluntarily intoxicated.59
V. OKLAHOMA LIQUOR LIABILITY
A. Statutory Development
In 1907, the Oklahoma legislature enacted the Dram Shop Prohibi-
tion Act.' This Act banned all alcohol and made one who supplied al-
cohol liable to anyone injured by the intoxicated person.61 Enactment of
54. Id (citation omitted).
55. See, e.g., Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1961); Soronen v. Olde Milford
Inn, Inc., 218 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1966).
56. See infra note 107, at 230.
57. Cf. Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979) (allowing assumption of risk as
defense); Dynarski v. U-Crest Fire Dist., 447 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1981) (allowing the defense of compara-
tive negligence). But see, e.g., Rhyner v. Madden, 457 A.2d 1243 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
(refusing to allow comparative negligence as a defense).
58. See BErrMAN, supra note 23, at 9.
There appears to be a growing trend in state statutes to deny recovery to the intoxicated
person himself. Legislatures have apparently concluded, even if state courts have not, that
an injured person should not recover for his injury if he had a hand in it by the over
consumption of alcoholic beverages.
Id.
59. See, eg., Paul v. Hogan, 392 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1977); Hollerud v. Malamis, 174
N.W.2d 626 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
60. Prohibition Act, ch. 69, 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 594 (codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
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the 1959 Alcoholic Beverage Control Act repealed the Dram Shop Pro-
hibition Act. 2 Since this effective repeal, the Oklahoma legislature has
not imposed any specific statutory liability on the tavern owner in con-
junction with serving liquor. 3 In fact, the legislature in 1985 attempted
to establish new dram shop legislation only to have the bill defeated."
However, as illustrated, many states have imposed liability against fur-
nishers of alcohol simply by judicial decision. Hence, when faced with
Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc.,65 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was not alone in imposing liability on tavern owners in the absence of
specific dram shop legislation.
B. Judicial Development
Brigance marked the beginning of Oklahoma's judicial development
of liquor liability. The Velvet Dove Restaurant served alcohol to a minor
who was subsequently in a one-car accident which injured his passenger
Shawn Brigance.66 Brigance sued the Velvet Dove Restaurant to recover
for his injuries.67 Having no Oklahoma dram shop legislation or prece-
dent on which to rely, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim.6 Brigance appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
seeking reversal of the dismissal. 9
The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that a commercial alco-
hol vendor may be held liable when a third person is injured by an intoxi-
cated patron who was negligently served alcohol.7 0 The court found
duty on the part of the tavern owner based in part on Oklahoma's Alco-
hol Beverage Control Act which prohibits tavern owners from furnishing
alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons and minors.71 The court also
established duty based on the negligence principles of section 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides liability against a person
who knowingly furnishes a chattel to others that could cause them
harm.7
2
To find causation on the part of the tavern, however, the patron's
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 501 (1981).
63. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1986).
64. S. 116, 40th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985).
65. 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
66. Id. at 302.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 301.
70. Id at 302.
71. See id at 304.
72. Id See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 390 (1965).
[Vol. 27:69
8
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operation of a motor vehicle must not have been a supervening cause of
the plaintiff's injuries." Accordingly, the court examined whether the
patron's driving was a cause of injury "(1) independent of the original act,
(2) adequate of itself to bring about the result, and (3) one whose occur-
rence was not reasonably foreseeable," but found that a jury could find
that the driving was not independent and adequate of itself, or that plain-
tiff's injuries were a foreseeable result of the negligent sale of alcohol.74
Therefore, the legal chain of causation between the negligent sale and the
plaintiff's injuries was unbroken. 5
Having established civil liability on the part of the tavern owner to-
ward third parties injured as a result of the negligent service of alcohol,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court opened the door for further expansion of
liquor liability. Additional opportunity to define the parameters of com-
mercial vendor liability was soon provided in the case of Todd 1.76
VI. OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. vl TODD
Rick Robertson, filed a cross-claim in federal court against co-de-
fendant Phil Todd, owner of Todd's Tavern, for injuries Robertson sus-
tained as a result of a one-car accident which occurred after leaving
Todd's Tavern."7 Robertson claimed that, in violation of Oklahoma's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,"8 he was served liquor while he was
noticeably intoxicated and contended that the tavern was liable for his
injuries.79 Because the action had been brought in federal court raising a
novel issue of law, the question of first party recovery was certified to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. 0
In response, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that a tavern pa-
tron had a cause of action against a tavern owner for injuries suffered in a
one car accident after such patron was served alcohol by the tavern. 1
The court found no statutory duty based on Oklahoma's Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Act on the part of the tavern, but instead, found a duty
based on the common law duty of a person not to create an unreasonable
73. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305.
74. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. 1982)).
75. Id
76. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 61 OKLA. B.J. 3016 (1990).
77. Id. at 3017.
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537 (Supp. 1991).
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risk of harm to others.82 Seven months later, the court granted the plain-
tiff's motion for rehearing. 3
On rehearing, the court vacated its previous decision finding that an
adult who voluntarily becomes intoxicated and is subsequently injured in
an automobile accident does not have a cause of action against the tavern
owner.84 The court based its decision on an interpretation of Oklahoma's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and public policy." Examining the req-
uisite elements of a negligence cause of action, the court found the ele-
ment of duty to be missing.8 6 Reasoning that the Brigance innocent
bystander cause of action was intended to protect only the unsuspecting
public, the court refused to impose such a duty with regard to the inebri-
ate.87 Moreover, the court refused to impose a duty based on the com-
mon law duty of every person to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of
harm to others, stating that it would be against public policy to reward
the inebriate for his immoderation. 8
Robertson argued that an intoxicated person lacks the requisite self
control to understand risks and asserted that the court should impose a
common law duty on the tavern owner.89 The court rejected this argu-
ment and found that the tavern owner had neither a common law nor a
statutory duty to an intoxicated patron.90
Although the Brigance decision recognized a duty based on the
Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act's prohibition of the sale of
liquor to intoxicated persons,91 the Todd II court determined that this
statute was not enacted to protect the inebriated driver himself.92
We find nothing in [Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act] or
in any of the statutes regulating the sale of alcohol, which indicates
that the legislature intended to protect the intoxicated adult who, by
his own actions, causes injury to himself. Instead, it appears that the
legislature intended to protect the unsuspecting public-in effect all of
the populace except the willing imbiber.93
82. See Id. at 3019.
83. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508 (Okla. 1991).
84. Id. at 512.
85. Id. at 509.
86. Id. at 510-11.
87. Id. at 510.
88. Id. at 511.
89. See Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Todd (No. 72,490).
90. See Todd, 813 P.2d at 512.
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537(A)(2) (Supp. 1985).
92. See Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.
93. Id (footnote omitted).
(V/ol. 27:69
10




By refusing to allow first party liability, Oklahoma joined the major-
ity of states that have denied recovery to an adult who voluntarily be-
comes intoxicated and subsequently injures himself.94 Generally, these
jurisdictions have determined that the voluntary inebriate should not be
rewarded for his self-indulgent acts." On the other hand, some courts
have used common law negligence principles to extend such liability to
the tavern owner.96 These courts hold that a tavern owner owes a duty
of care when serving a patron alcoholic beverages. The duty of care can
be determined by a number of public policy factors: (1) the ethical and
moral factor, (2) the economic factor, and (3) the prophylactic factor.97
However, in weighing factors such as these against the first party plain-
tiff, the Todd II court decided that no duty should be established.98
A. An Inebriate Should Not Be Rewarded For His Own Immoderation
Although there are a vast number of injuries and deaths sustained
by drunken drivers, 99 it is unfair to place the blame and responsibility on
the tavern owner. These drivers were not forced to drink. Although ar-
guably they were not able to exercise free will at the time of driving, the
fact remains that they freely chose to drink to excess. Under Brigance, a
tavern owner has a duty to the innocent bystander; however, this finding
does not mandate a finding of duty to the inebriate himself.
While the typical third party plaintiff is the innocent bystander who
took no part in the drinking and had no opportunity to prevent his in-
jury, the first party plaintiff is a voluntary inebriate who should not bene-
fit from his bad judgement. In fact, where the third party is not innocent
but has contributed to the driver's intoxication, many courts have limited
or denied his recovery."° With the advent of third party recovery,
courts concluded that an abrogation of the common law rule of nonliabil-
ity was justified to protect the innocent bystander from the drunken
94. See BErrMAN, supra note 23, at 9.
95. See, eg., Allen v. County of Westchester, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Trujillo v. Trujillo, 721 P.2d 1310, 1313 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 720 P.2d 708 (N.M. 1986).
96. See eg., Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Alesna v. Legrue, 614
P.2d 1387 (Alaska 1980); Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 207 (Ariz. 1983); McClellan v. Tot-
tenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 1983); Freeman v. Finney, 309 S.E.2d 531 (N.C. 1983).
97. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1034
(1928).
98. See Todd, 813 P.2d at 512.
99. See Kostas, supra note 1, at 1325.
100. See, eg., James v. Wicker, 33 N.E.2d 169 (III. App. Ct. 1941); Plamondon v. Matthews, 385
N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Barrett v. Campbell, 345 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
1991]
11
Sawyer: Walking the Line of Liquor Liability: Ohio Casualty Insurance Com
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
driver. 10 1 However, this reasoning should not be extended to the inebri-
ate who had the opportunity to prevent his own injury. For example, a
worker may not recover for injuries sustained as a result of his own in-
toxication.'0 2 Similarly, a criminal defendant is held responsible for his
criminal behavior committed during his.intoxication.10 3
The Todd II dissent argued that it is illogical to distinguish between
the first party driving the car, and the third party who is an intoxicated
passenger.' 4 Although an intoxicated passenger is not the typical inno-
cent bystander, he would theoretically still have the benefit of a Brigance
cause of action against the commercial vendor. However, in such scena-
rios, courts have often limited or even denied recovery.' 0 5 The Todd II
dissent ignored the fact that the intoxicated passenger did not drive the
car and endanger innocent people's lives. Although this person cannot
be called an "innocent" bystander, he is still highly distinguishable from
the first party inebriate. He is not a drunken driver.
Furthermore, allowing the inebriate to recover for his injuries would
open the "floodgates" of litigation. By extension, the patron might sue
not only for his automobile-related injuries, but also for his falling down
as he leaves the tavern. 0 6 In an extreme case, the patron might even
claim that the tavern should be responsible for his intentional torts.10 7
Consequently, a great amount of judicial time would be wasted in dispos-
ing of cases having little or no merit.
B. Scope of the Todd II Decision
While Brigance originally established commercial vendor liability,
the Todd I decision has limited this liability to third parties. However,
Todd II is restricted to narrow facts and numerous important issues are
still unresolved. Questions concerning sales made to minors or mentally
disabled persons remain unanswered. Although the court found a lack of
duty to the inebriate, minors and mentally disabled persons require a
101. See Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant Inc., 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986); Rappaport v.
Nichols, 156 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959).
102. Todd, 813 P.2d at 512.
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. See id. at 522.
105. See, eg., James v. Wicker, 33 N.E.2d 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941); Plamondon v. Matthews, 385
N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Barrett v. Campbell, 345 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
106. See Todd, 813 P.2d at 512. "Pause, if you will and contemplate the vast number of claims
that may be urged by drunks, if they were entitled to every expense and injury that are natural
concomitants of their intoxication." Id. (citation omitted).
107. See generally Madeleine E. Kelly, Liquor Liability and Blame Shifting Defenses: Do They
Mix? 69 MARQ. L. REv. 217 (1986).
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higher standard of care. By analogy, one is negligent if he places a
loaded firearm within reach of young children or mentally disabled per-
sons, and one in possession of a dangerous instrumentality readily acces-
sible to children is required by law to protect them from injury.'018
Minors and mentally disabled persons are distinguishable from an adult
who becomes voluntarily intoxicated since, unlike the adult, they are un-
able to understand and appreciate the risks related to their actions even
before such actions are taken. 9 Therefore, when minors and mentally
disabled persons are first party plaintiffs, it would be reasonable to find
that public policy does not bar a duty on the part of the tavern owner.
Oklahoma courts have also not yet addressed the issue of the social
host.110 While public policy concerning drinking and driving may sup-
port liability, the average social host is less economically able to sustain
liability than the average commercial vendor. More importantly, a social
host would be less experienced at recognizing the signs of intoxication
than a commercial vendor. Many courts have reasoned that the social
host, unlike the commercial vendor, receives no economic gain from fur-
nishing alcohol.111 Consequently, it would be unfair to hold the social
host to the same standard as the vendor.
C. Model Dram Shop Act
In Oklahoma's future, the area of dram shop liability will most cer-
tainly demand a great deal of litigation to answer the questions of social
host liability and whether persons under disabilities are owed a special
duty. Oklahoma could avoid the costs of further litigation with the im-
mediate enactment of dram shop legislation. The author suggests the
following model based on dram shop acts of other states:" 2
108. Todd, 813 P. 2d at 516 n.11 (citing Hart v. Lewis, 103 P.2d 65, 67 (Okla. 1940); Wroth v.
McKinney, 373 P.2d 216, 219 (Kan. 1962)).
109. See Todd, 813 P.2d at 516.
110. See Brigance, 725 P.2d at 306 n.12.
111. BErrMAN, supra note 23, at 13 (citing Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985)).
112. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 2501-2519 (West 1988); RI. GEN. LAWS
§§ 3-14-1 to 3-14-15 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
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MODEL DRAM SHOP ACT
Definitions
In this chapter:
(1) "Provider" means a person who sells or serves an alcoholic bev-
erage under authority of a license or permit issued under the terms
of this code or who otherwise sells an alcoholic beverage to such
individual.
(2) "Provision" includes, but is not limited to, the sale or service of
an alcoholic beverage.
Plaintiffs
1. Except as provided in subsection 2, any individual who suffers
damage, as provided in this Act may bring an action under this Act
against a provider for negligently serving liquor to an individual.
2. The following may not bring an action under this Act against a
provider for negligently serving liquor to an individual:
A. The intoxicated individual if he or she is 18 years of age or
older when served by the server;
B. The estate of the intoxicated individual if the intoxicated indi-
vidual was 18 years of age or older when served by the server.
Negligent service of liquor; liability
1. A provider who negligently serves liquor to a minor is liable for
damages proximately caused by that minor's consumption of the
liquor.
2. A provider who negligently serves liquor to a visibly intoxicated
individual is liable for damages proximately caused by that individ-
ual's consumption of the liquor.
3. A provider who negligently serves liquor to a mentally disabled
person is liable for damages proximately caused by that person's
consumption of liquor.
4. Service of liquor to a minor, to a mentally disabled person or to
an intoxicated individual is negligent if the provider knows, or if a
reasonable and prudent person in similar circumstances would
know, that the individual being served is a minor, mentally disabled
or is visibly intoxicated.
[Vol. 27:69
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5. A provider is not chargeable with knowledge of an individual's
consumption of liquor or other drugs off the provider's premises,
unless the individual's appearance and behavior, or other actions
known to the provider would put a reasonable and prudent person
on notice of such consumption.
Damages
1. Damages may be awarded for property damage, bodily injury,
and death proximately caused by the consumption of liquor served
by the provider.
Liquor Service Education
The commercial vendor shall provide to employees responsible for
serving liquor educational services regarding retail liquor sales in-
cluding but not limited to seminars, pamphlets or informational
signs on the following subjects:
1. The effects alcohol can have on the body and on a person's be-
havior, in particular, driving ability.
2. Characteristic signs of the problem drinker and of intoxication.
3. State liquor liability and drunk driving statutes.
4. The possible effects one may experience when combining alco-
hol and legal or illegal drugs.'13
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the court's decision in Todd II prohibited first party re-
covery from vendors, server liability with respect to third party "inno-
cent bystander" plaintiffs was preserved. The enactment of a
comprehensive dram shop act would establish more definite guidelines
for the provider of alcohol and would benefit the public directly by pro-
moting server intervention. Providing the server with statutory guide-
lines would also decrease the costs of litigation by eliminating imprecise
and vague standards. Furthermore, several states in the Tenth Circuit
have already enacted some form of dram shop legislation.' 4 By requir-
ing specific actions of the commercial vendor, such as employee educa-
tion, the instances of drunken driving would decrease. With the great
113. BErrMAN, supra note 23, at 20.
114. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-101 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Michie 1989);
COLO. REV. STAT § 13-21-103 (1987).
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number of alcohol-related injuries and deaths, enactment of a dram shop
act would enable commercial servers to reduce or completely eliminate
their potential liability, as well as misfortune to others.
Melissa Kay Sawyer
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